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Abstract	
	
	
									Is	foreign	aid	helpful	or	harmful	in	African	countries?	Even	though	scholars	have	tried	to	
answer	this	question	for	decades,	it	is	still	unclear	if	foreign	aid	has	efficiently	helped	the	
African	continent	to	overcome	the	challenges	that	arose	with	the	end	of	Colonization.	A	priority	
for	the	African	countries	was	to	reorganize	the	institutions	in	order	to	reestablish	autonomous	
and	stable	system	of	governance.	An	important	amount	of	help	for	this	reconstruction	has	
come	from	external	actors,	that	have	been	referred	to	in	the	literature	as	foreign	aid.	In	this	
paper,	I	seek	to	test	the	relationship	between	the	foreign	aid	mentioned	above,	and	political	
stability.	Some	scholars	argue	that	African	countries	receiving	an	important	amount	of	foreign	
aid	are	more	likely	to	be	governed	by	a	corrupted	government	and	therefore	will	be	politically	
unstable,	while	others	believe	that	foreign	aid	is	positively	related	to	the	quality	of	governance	
and	to	the	political	stability	of	the	recipient	country.	
Does	Foreign	aid	lead	to	political	stability	or	does	it	fuel	instability	and	violence	in	order	for	
western	countries	to	keep	a	certain	form	of	control	over	their	former	colonies?		
Throughout	this	case	study,	I	will	test	the	foreign	aid	and	political	instability	theory	and	
determine	whether	the	results	support	the	theory.		
	
	
	
	
Key	Words:	Foreign	Aid,	Governance,	Political	Stability,	Post	Colonization,	Rwanda,	Democratic	
Republic	of	Congo,	Botswana,	Gabon
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1. End	of	Colonization	and	Political	Stability	
	
								After	centuries	of	colonization	and	European	control	over	the	African	territory,	countries	
had	to	learn	how	to	govern	for	themselves,	by	establishing	new	autonomous	governments.	
Whilst	some	countries	obtained	their	independence	through	a	peaceful	process,	others,	such	as	
Algeria,	became	independent	following	years	of	violent	conflict	with	their	colonizer.		
In	order	for	these	countries	to	become	successful	actors	on	the	international	scene,	it	is	
important	for	them	to	establish	new	autonomous	and	efficient	institutions	that	will,	in	the	long	
term,	bring	economic	growth	and	political	stability,	both	essential	factors	in	the	development	of	
a	country.	Unfortunately,	a	lot	of	African	countries,	after	decades	of	colonization,	were	not	
prepared	for	a	complete	political,	economic	and	institutional	autonomy.	Indeed,	numerous	
African	countries	came	out	of	the	decolonization	process	with	very	weak	institutions,	which	led	
to	weak	economies	and	unstable	governments.	One	of	the	solutions	to	overcome	these	
problems	was	initiated	by	the	international	community	through	the	form	of	economic	aid,	
often	referred	to	in	the	literature	as	foreign	aid.	Thus,	since	the	end	of	colonization,	African	
countries	have	received	billions	of	dollars	of	aid	from	developed	countries,	usually	under	the	
form	of	“government	to	government”	transfer	(Peron,	2001),	which	decreases	the	ability	of	the	
international	community	to	have	a	direct	control	over	the	use	of	these	financial	aids.	Even	
though	foreign	aid	has	been	created	to	ensure	positive	and	development	purposes,	it	has	often	
been	used	for	personal,	destructive	or/and	genocidal	ends	by	African	leaders	(Peron,	2001).	
								To	understand	political	instability	in	the	context	of	this	paper,	it	is	important	to	understand	
the	interdependence	between	foreign	aid	and	governance,	as	bad	governance	is	a	factor	in	the	
rise	of	political	instability	(Xu,	2011).	Numerous	scholars	have	focused	their	work	on	the	
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relationship	between	foreign	aid	and	poverty,	foreign	aid	and	governance,	foreign	aid	and	
institutions	and	foreign	aid	and	corruption,	giving	us	a	good	theoretical	view	on	the	topic.	No	
comparative	work,	however,	has	yet	been	done	to	highlight	the	difference	between	African	
countries	who	receive	an	important	amount	of	help	and	countries	whose	amount	of	received	
foreign	aid	is	below	average,	and	how	this	difference	impacts	the	political	stability	of	the	
country.	In	the	context	of	this	paper,	a	“high”	amount	of	aid	will	characterize	an	average	annual	
amount	of	foreign	aid	higher	than	1000	million	dollars,	and	“low”	any	annual	average	amount	
below	1000	million	dollars	a	year	for	the	2010-2016	time	period.	In	order	to	test	the	foreign	aid	
and	political	instability	theory,	I	will	focus	on	the	interdependence	between	the	two	actors	
discussed	above	as	well	as	the	quality	of	governance,	and	see	if	the	theory	according	to	which	a	
higher	amount	of	foreign	aid	leads	to	a	low	quality	of	governance,	and	so,	to	a	political	
instability,	is	supported.		
	
								This	paper	will	proceed	as	follows:	First,	I	will	discuss	the	main	existing	theories	about	
foreign	aid	and	political	stability	by	giving	an	overview	of	the	existing	work	on	the	relationship	
between	foreign	aid	and	institutions,	foreign	aid	and	governance,	foreign	aid	and	corruption	
and	finally,	foreign	aid	and	poverty.	I	will	then	highlight	the	two	main	theories	that	have	divided	
international	relations	scholars	within	the	years:	those	arguing	that	aid	brings	a	positive	
outcome	in	the	recipient	country,	and	another	group	of	scholars	who	argue	that	foreign	aid	has	
done	more	harm	than	good.	
	
	 3	
								This	section	will	be	followed	by	the	method	section	where	I’ll	explain	my	choice	of	case	
studies	and	how	they	will	be	useful	in	the	study	of	foreign	aid	and	political	instability	theory,	by	
measuring	how	and	if	foreign	aid	has	affected	the	political	stability	in	these	countries,	looking	at	
the	quality	of	governance,	that	will	be	measured	by	the	level	of	corruption,	poverty,	as	well	as	
the	civil	and	political	liberties	in	the	recipient	country	(Menard	&	Weill,	2016).	
	
								Following	this	overview	of	the	existing	literature	on	the	topic,	the	paper	will	then	offer	a	
rich	case	study	analysis	of	four	African	countries	to	illustrate	the	theory:	Rwanda,	Democratic	
Republic	of	Congo,	Botswana	and	Gabon.	As	the	analysis	is	based	on	the	impact	of	foreign	aid	
on	political	stability,	the	countries	presented	above	will	be	divided	into	two	groups:	Rwanda	
and	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	representing	the	countries	that	have	received	an	important	
amount	of	foreign	aid,	and	the	second	group,	Botswana	and	Gabon,	illustrating	the	countries	
that	received	an	amount	of	aid	inferior	to	the	African	average.		
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2. Existing	Theories	of	Foreign	Aid	and	Political	Stability	
								Foreign	aid	is	a	relatively	new	element	in	international	relations.	As	explained	above,	
foreign	aid	predominantly	became	a	major	actor	in	international	relations,	especially	in	the	
North-South	relationship	-or	in	other	words,	between	developed	and	underdeveloped	countries	
-	after	the	end	of	the	colonization	era.	Even	though	we	can	track	back	forms	of	direct	aid	from	
rich	countries	to	poorer	countries	back	to	the	1800s,	it	is	only	after	the	decolonization	of	Africa,	
Latin	America	and	Asia	that	foreign	aid	became	regular	between	the	new	autonomous	
countries	and	their	former	colonizer	(Chiba	&	Heinrich,	2016).	The	principal	goal	for	these	new	
states	was	to	catch	up	with	the	developed	countries	and	find	their	place	in	the	status	quo	
(Eyben,	2014),	and	the	only	way	to	achieve	this	goal	was	to	reestablish	strong	and	efficient	
institutions,	economy	and	system	of	governance,	with	foreign	aid	as	a	major	tool	to	rebuild	the	
countries’	infrastructures.		
	
								Foreign	aid	is	also	perceived	as	a	major	tool	in	the	political	and	economic	reconstruction	
following	a	period	of	conflict	(Manning	&	Malbrough,	2014).	The	first	large	scale	illustration	of	a	
post	conflict	aid	is	the	Marshall	Plan	following	the	end	of	World	War	II.	The	economic	aid	
distributed	by	the	United	States	to	the	devastated	Western	European	countries	helped	the	
former	European	powers	to	quickly	rebuild	their	infrastructure	and	reposition	their	influence	
on	the	international	level,	alongside	the	United	States,	and	against	the	USSR	during	the	cold	
war	period	(Toussaint	et	al,	2008).		
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In	order	to	understand	the	relationship	between	foreign	aid	and	the	recipient	country’s	political	
stability,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	impact	of	foreign	aid	on	various	country’s	actors:	
institutions,	economic	growth	and	governance.	
	
								The	next	part	of	this	article	will	highlight	the	relationship	between	foreign	aid	and	the	
actors	presented	above,	as	it	has	been	discussed	in	previous	work	by	scholars	who	are	mainly	
divided	into	two	groups:	those	who	argue	that	foreign	aid	is	vital	for	the	development	of	the	
African	continent	(Rosalyn,	2014)	and	the	scholars	who	defend	the	“neo	colonialist”	theory	that	
foreign	aid	is	the	contemporary	mean	used	by	Western	powers	to	maintain	their	control	over	
their	former	colonies.	They	argue	that	foreign	aid	is	a	way	for	western	countries	to	create	a	
system	of	aid	dependency	in	order	for	the	European	powers	to	keep	their	influence	over	their	
former	colonies	(Wauthier,	1972;	Moyo,	2009).	
	
								First,	the	relationship	between	Foreign	Aid	and	Institutions	has	been	discussed	by	various	
scholars,	including	Deborah	A.	Brautigam	and	Stephen	Knack	(2004),	who	argue	that	even	
though	an	important	amount	of	foreign	aid	is	included	into	government	budgets	in	various	
African	countries,	these	states	are	still	characterized	by	weak	institutions	and	weak	systems	of	
governance,	as	well	as	a	high	level	of	corruption.	As	discussed	in	the	first	section	of	this	paper,	
the	authors	argue	that	these	problems	are	due	to	the	colonial	legacy,	and	the	inability	of	the	
African	countries	to	develop	and	establish	strong	and	efficient	institutions	to	keep	up	with	the	
developed	countries	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	2004).	This	colonialist	“heritage”	is	not	the	only	factor	
that	led	African	nations	to	where	they	are	today.	Thus,	high	amount	of	foreign	aid	can	promote	
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economic	growth	and	strong	institutions	when	they	are	implemented	in	countries	with	
governments	open	to	development	and	whose	economy	is	characterized	by	good	
macroeconomic	policies	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	2004).	According	to	Elliot	R.Morss,	foreign	aid	has	
a	destructive	effect	on	institutions	when	the	country	is	receiving	a	significant	amount	of	foreign	
aid	and	is	unable	to	efficiently	use	this	aid	for	successful	economic	ends	(1984).	Despite	some	
scholars	arguing	that	foreign	aid	is	destructive	for	African	countries	and	that	the	complete	
abandon	of	foreign	economic	aid	is	the	solution	to	the	African	problems,	numerous	other	
scholars	argue	that	foreign	aid	is	a	major	tool	in	the	development	of	the	African	continent,	
however	its	distribution	simply	has	to	be	reorganized	in	order	for	countries	to	use	this	aid	more	
efficiently	(Lister	&	Stevens,	1992).		
	
								Whilst	various	scholars	believe	foreign	aid	has	done	more	harm	than	good	on	African	
institutions,	others	defend	the	importance	of	foreign	aid	in	the	fight	against	poverty.	Among	
them,	Boriana	Yontcheva	and	Nadia	Masud	(2005)	defend	the	theory	that	foreign	aid	has	
played	a	major	role	in	the	evolution	of	human	development	indicators	(HDIs),	by	focusing	their	
work	on	the	impact	of	aid	on	infant	mortality	and	education,	as	part	of	the	Millenium	
Development	Goals,	established	by	the	United	Nations	in	2015	(Wagge	et	al,	2015),	where	all	
the	UN	member	states	and	international	organizations	established	the	goal	to	eliminate	
poverty	and	hunger	in	under	developed	countries	while	promoting	education	and	gender	
equality.		
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								Another	way	in	which	foreign	aid	can	help	countries	to	overcome	poverty	is	if	the	aid	is	
given	to	support	liberal	regimes,	who	are	more	likely	to	have	better	human	development	
indicators	than	other	regimes	(Boone,	1996).	In	this	way,	short	term	foreign	aid	is	more	likely	to	
positively	impact	the	level	poverty	of	the	country,	if	the	government	is	more	constrained	to	use	
aid	for	development	purposes.	Whilst	Yontcheva	and	Masud	argue	that	Non-Governmental	
Organizations	are	the	most	effective	in	resolving	poverty	and	ameliorating	the	human	
development	indicator,	others	like	Aberra	Senbeta	argue	that	multilateral	aid,	through	the	
implementation	of	grants	instead	of	loans,	will	have	a	bigger	impact	on	poverty	reduction	
opposed	to	bilateral	aid,	by	controlling	the	average	income	(2009).	To	understand	the	
relationship	between	foreign	aid	and	poverty	reduction,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	
interdependence	between	foreign	aid	and	economic	growth.	In	order	for	aid	to	positively	affect	
the	average	income	of	civilians,	it	first	has	to	stimulate	the	economic	growth	of	the	country,	
and	then	translate	the	increase	in	the	economy	into	an	increase	in	the	population	income	
(Senbeta	2009).	Direct	multilateral	aid,	according	to	Senbeta,	is	the	most	efficient	form	of	
foreign	aid	to	reduce	poverty	in	under	developed	countries,	by	targeting	special	goals	and	by	
creating	a	chance	for	the	population	to	play	a	role	in	the	economy	rather	than	using	foreign	aid	
with	unique	goal	to	stimulate	the	economy	(2009).	
	
								To	summarize,	we	can	divide	scholars	into	two	groups.	The	first	group,	represented	by	
scholars	such	as	Milton	Friedman,	believe	that	foreign	aid	has	consequently	harmed	recipient	
countries,	by	decreasing	economic	growth	and	affecting	the	development	of	the	population,	as	
well	as	democracy	(1995).	Friedman	is	not	the	only	one	who	believes	foreign	aid	needs	to	be	
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revised	or	abolished.	Other	scholars	like	William	Easterly	and	Peter	Bauer	also	criticize	foreign	
aid	by	highlighting	cases	where	the	level	of	poverty	is	still	very	high	despite	subsequently	
amount	of	aid	received	by	the	countries	(Shleifer	2009).	The	major	problem	of	foreign	aid,	
according	to	William	Easterly,	is	that	it	rarely	reaches	the	population	(2003).	Contrary	to	
Friedman	who	is	in	favor	of	the	abolition	of	foreign	aid,	Easterly	argues	that	foreign	aid	can	still	
be	an	actor	to	overcome	the	problem	of	poverty.	However,	in	order	to	be	effective,	aid	cannot	
continue	as	it	is	today,	with	billions	of	dollars	sent	to	under	developed	countries	every	year,	but	
a	level	of	poverty	that	hasn’t	decreased,	or	worse,	has	increased	in	certain	countries.	Using	
these	arguments,	Easterly	argues	that	foreign	aid	does	not	need	to	be	completely	abandoned,	
but	aid	donors	must	give	more	importance	to	how	the	recipient	government	will	use	the	
money,	and	make	sure	that	aid	reaches	the	population	(Easterly,	2003).	
	
								In	order	for	foreign	aid	to	have	a	positive	direct	impact	on	the	population,	the	recipient	
government	must	be	willing	to	use	this	aid	toward	development	ends	(Booth,	2008).		
Unfortunately,	foreign	aid,	when	associated	with	bad	governance,	can	be	translated	into	high	
levels	of	corruption	within	the	institutions	and	the	government	of	the	recipient	country,	which	
can	lead	to	political	instability	due	to	the	population’s	discontent	(Xu,	2011;	Svensson,	2000).	As	
discussed	by	Easterly	and	Bauer,	foreign	aid	has	largely	contributed	to	the	increase	in	wealth	of	
the	elites	in	countries	while	the	level	of	poverty	keeps	increasing	among	the	population	
(Shleifer	2009	;	Easerly,	2003).	This	leads	to	the	question:	Is	there	a	relationship	between	
foreign	aid,	governance	and	corruption?	
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Since	it’s	been	proved	that	an	important	part	of	foreign	aid	directly	goes	into	the	government	
hands	(Alesina	&	Dollar,	2000),	it	is	now	important	to	understand	how	governments	use	this	
money,	in	order	to	better	understand	the	division	within	scholars	concerning	foreign	aid.	Arthur	
A.	Goldsmith	argues	that	foreign	aid	has	destructive	effects	on	African	governments	by	
corrupting	its	institutions,	avoiding	the	development	of	a	democratic	state,	essential	for	the	
economic	and	political	development	of	the	country	(Goldmsith,	2001).	Whilst	the	official	goal	of	
economic	foreign	aid	is	to	help	the	poor	states	to	develop	efficient,	strong	and	independent	
institutions,	it	has	been	argued	that	foreign	aid	is	in	fact	a	major	cause	in	the	African	countries’	
dependence	to	external	actors,	or	in	other	words,	Africa’s	dependence	on	the	West	(Goldsmith,	
2001	;	Brautigam,	2000).	Results	have	shown	that	important	amount	of	aid	aimed	at	improving	
governance	by	implementing	democracy	have	failed	to	do	so,	and,	in	some	cases,	have	had	the	
opposite	outcome,	and	have	weakened	the	institutions	(Ndulu	&	O’Connell,	1999).	Political	
stability	is	often	defined	as	a	decrease	in	poverty,	an	increase	in	job	offers,	an	increase	in	the	
states	revenue	and	investments	as	well	as	an	amelioration	of	education	and	welfare	and	the	
absence	of	violence	(Shepard,	2010).	Whilst	foreign	aid	is	described	by	various	scholar	as	a	
major	factor	in	the	decrease	of	the	poverty	level	and	the	increase	in	corruption,	it	can	also	play	
a	role	in	the	political	stability	or	instability	of	the	recipient	country,	by	leading	to	ethnic	division	
as	well	as	political	rivalries	and	violence	due	to	discontentment	or	jealousy	(Svensson,	2000).	
Whilst	foreign	aid’s	main	goal	is	to	help	countries	to	develop	strong	and	independent	
institutions,	in	order	to	become	economically	and	politically	stronger,	some	governments	
(unwilling	to	use	this	aid	for	long	term	development	goals)	keep	the	foreign	aid	for	personal	
use,	which	leads	to	an	increase	in	the	level	of	corruption	(Alesina	and	Dollar,	2000)	and	an	
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increase	in	the	possibility	of	social	revolts	(Xu,	2011).	In	other	words,	foreign	aid,	when	directly	
given	to	governments	for	public	consumption,	is	more	likely	to	be	related	to	an	increase	in	
corruption,	rather	than	foreign	aid	in	the	form	of	direct	investment,	which	is	more	likely	to	
decrease	the	risk	of	corruption	(Asongu,	2012;	Jellal,	2013).		
	
								Various	scholars	have	discussed	the	causal	effect	between	foreign	aid,	how	it	weakens	
Institutions	and	leads	to	political	instability,	and	use	various	variables	to	measure	the	degree	of	
efficiency	of	the	institution:	Weak	governance,	decrease	of	the	economic	growth	and	
political/civil	liberties	(including	military	repression	and	violence	between	political	parties	and	
ethnic	groups)	(Menard	&	Weill,	2016).		
	
								Foreign	aid	has	been	analyzed	by	numerous	scholars	as	a	major	actor	in	the	deterioration	
of	certain	African	states’	institutions.	By	being	directly	transferred	to	governments,	and	not	
translated	into	direct	investments,	that	would	increase	economic	growth	and	decrease	the	level	
of	corruption	(Sambeta,	2009),	foreign	aid	can	be	either	a	tool	against	poverty	and	
underdevelopment,	or	a	major	actor	favoring	underdevelopment	and	poverty,	by	being	used	
for	personal	ends	or	for	military	ends	by	the	government	in	order	to	stay	in	power	(Alesina	&	
Dollar,	2000	;	Kono&	Montinola,	2013).		In	this	situation,	foreign	aid	is	more	likely	to	be	
deviated	from	its	original	function,	and	be	used	against	civilians,	by	reducing	civil	liberties	
through	military	and	authoritarian	means.	Aid	that	was	originally	aimed	at	encouraging	
development,	if	not	received	by	an	efficient	government,	will	lead	to	weak	governance,	
represented	by	a	high	level	of	corruption,	an	increase	in	the	violation	of	the	civil	and	political	
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rights,	a	stagnation	or	increase	in	the	level	of	poverty	and	political	instability	in	the	recipient	
country	(Menard	&	Weill,	2016).	This	can	lead	to	political	disputes	and/or	tensions	due	to	the	
inequalities	between	the	elites	and	the	population	(Easterly,	2003).	In	other	words,	foreign	aid	
can	lead	to	the	corruption,	low	quality	of	governance	and	the	weakening	of	institutions,	which	
will	more	likely	lead	to	political	instability,	either	through	the	violation	of	the	civil	and	political	
rights	of	the	government’s	opposition,	violent	repression	from	the	government,	or	through	
ethnic	tensions	due	to	the	omnipresence	of	one	ethnic	group	in	the	corrupted	government.	In	
other	words,	when	foreign	aid,	directly	or	indirectly,	favors	one	ethnic	group	more	than	
another	there	will	be	an	increase	in	ethnic	tensions	(Easterly,	2001	;	Moyo,	2009).	Whilst	
foreign	aid	can	enhance	corruption,	foreign	aid	can	also	indirectly	favor	instability	in	the	African	
countries,	and	any	increase	in	corruption	and	instability	will	mean	an	increase	in	foreign	aid	
dependency	(Moyo,	2009).	
	
								To	conclude,	after	several	decades	of	foreign	aid,	with	billions	of	dollars	given	to	African	
countries,	the	African	continent	is	still	far	behind	Europe	or	North	America	in	term	of	
development	or	economic	growth.	After	decades	of	colonization	by	European	powers,	Africa	
wasn’t	ready	to	govern	for	its	own.	With	the	end	of	colonization,	African	states	had	to	face	
ethnic	tensions	and	rivalry,	that	erupted	during	the	colonial	rule.	With	these	ethnic	tensions,	
weak	economies,	weak	institutions	and	the	inability	to	govern	and	develop	the	country	in	this	
transition	period,	various	African	states	plunged	into	civil	war	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	2004).		
With	most	African	countries	that	faced	or	have	been	facing	political	instability	since	their	
independence,	the	colonial	legacy	is	still	strong	in	a	continent	that	is	struggling	to	keep	up	with	
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the	rest	of	the	international	actors.		The	first	step	in	the	political	and	economic	emancipation	of	
Africa	is	to	work	toward	political	stability	in	order	to	be	governed	by	efficient	and	strong	
institution	and	government,	who	will	be	willing	to	use	external	aid	as	well	as	internal	wealth	to	
increase	economic	growth,	social	development	and	decrease	poverty	among	its	population.	If	
the	problem	of	political	instability	is	resolved,	African	governments	will	be	able	to	efficiently	
work	toward	economic	stability	by	attracting	investors,	that	will	lead	to	an	increase	in	the	trade	
and	as	a	result,	a	decrease	in	the	level	of	dependency	to	foreign	aid	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	2004).		
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3. Methodology	
								Following	the	end	of	colonization	in	the	second	part	of	the	20th	century,	Africa	is	facing	a	
new	problem:	To	learn	how	to	govern	by	itself.	Even	though	decolonization	marked	the	first	
step	in	the	African	emancipation,	the	African	continent	was	not	ready	to	govern	for	its	own.	The	
colonial	legacy	left	Africa	with	weak	economies,	and	weak	institutions	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	
2004).	To	overcome	this	problem,	the	international	community	has	tried	to	help	the	African	
continent	by	providing	the	newly	African	states	different	forms	of	aid.	Whilst	the	official	version	
of	foreign	aid’s	goal	is	to	help	African	countries	to	establish	strong	and	efficient	institutions	in	
order	to	increase	the	economic	growth	and	by	doing	so,	to	decrease	the	level	of	poverty	among	
the	population,	scholars	have	different	views	on	the	topic.	Thus,	when	it	comes	to	foreign	aid,	
the	academic	world	divides	into	two	groups:	On	one	side,	those	who	believe	foreign	aid	is	
essential	to	the	economic	and	political	development	of	Africa.	They	argue	that	foreign	aid	and	
the	quality	of	governance	are	positively	related,	and	so,	positively	impacts	the	political	stability	
of	the	recipient	country	(Manning	&	Malbrough,	2014;	Yontcheva	&	Masud,	2005).		
	
								On	the	other	side,	scholars	like	William	Easterly	(2001),	believe	that	foreign	aid	has	done	
more	harm	than	good	and	has	weakened	institutions,	affected	the	quality	of	governance	of	the	
recipient	country,	and	this	weak	governance	has	led	to	political	instability	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	
2004	;	Svensson,	2000).	These	scholars	argue	that	foreign	aid	has	created	a	situation	of	aid	
dependency	to	Western	powers	and	that,	when	directly	given	to	governments,	has	increased	
the	level	of	corruption	within	the	institutions	and	the	government,	and	avoided	an	effective	
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development	of	African	countries,	what	led	to	the	discontent	of	the	population	and	as	a	result,	
ethnic	and	political	tensions	(Svensson,	2000;	Moyo,	2009).			
	
								As	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	political	stability	can	be	measured	by	the	frequency	in	
government	change	as	well	as	social	unrests	in	the	recipient	country	(Alesina	and	Perotti,	1996;	
Gupta	et	al,	1998;	Rodriguez,	2000),	social	tensions	and	unrest	that	are	due	to	the	population	
discontentment	toward	the	government,	in	other	words	towards	the	quality	of	governance	(Xu,	
2011).		
	
								In	this	paper,	I	will	focus	my	work	on	the	theory	discussed	above	according	to	which	
foreign	aid	is	related	to	a	poor-quality	governance,	and	so,	to	political	instability.	According	to	
this	theory,	countries	receiving	an	important	amount	of	aid	are	more	likely	to	be	politically	
unstable,	while	countries	receiving	an	amount	of	aid	lower	than	average	are	more	likely	to	be	
political	stable.	To	test	this	relationship	between	foreign	aid	political	instability,	I	will	use	a	case	
study	of	four	African	countries:	Rwanda,	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	Botswana	and	Gabon.	
To	highlight	the	difference	between	countries	who	have	perceived	a	“high”	level	of	foreign	aid,	
and	those	who	have	received	a	“low”	amount	of	development	aid,	I	will	divide	the	countries	
cited	above	into	two	groups:	Rwanda	and	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	representing	the	
countries	receiving	an	important	amount	of	foreign	aid,	and	on	the	other	side,	Botswana	and	
Gabon	as	examples	of	African	states	that	received	an	amount	of	foreign	aid	below	the	African	
average	(OECD	report,	2016).	Since	the	amount	of	foreign	aid	perceived	by	these	countries	has	
changed	over	time,	I	based	the	distinction	between	“high”	and	“low”	amount	of	aid	on	the	
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2010-2016	period	of	time,	with	“high”	amount	of	aid	representing	the	countries	who	receive	a	
consequential	amount	of	aid	(more	than	1000	million	a	year	during	this	time	period),	and	“low”	
amount	of	aid	for	the	countries	whose	amount	of	aid	has	been	lower	than	the	African	average	
(less	than	1000	million	dollars	a	year	during	the	2010-2016	period).	Even	though	the	overall	
annual	average	of	development	aid	given	to	African	countries	was	lower	at	its	beginning	in	the	
70’s,	Rwanda	and	the	RDC	have	always	received	more	development	aid	than	Botswana	and	
Gabon	(OECD	report,	2016	;	World	Bank	data,	2016).	For	this	work,	I	use	the	total	amount	of	aid	
rather	than	per	capita	because	the	size	of	the	country	or	its	population	hasn’t	affected	its	level	
of	corruption.	In	other	words,	the	cost	of	running	a	corrupted	government	is	not	related	to	the	
size	of	its	population.	
	
								Whilst	the	relationship	between	foreign	aid	and	the	quality	of	governance,	and	its	impact	
on	political	stability,	has	already	been	studied	by	various	scholars	(Kaufman	&	Kraag,	2008;	
Talpos	et	al.,	2012;	Steinwand,	2015),	this	case	study	brings	a	new	point	of	view	to	the	existing	
literature,	by	its	qualitative	nature	and	the	originality	of	the	countries	chosen	for	this	study.		
The	quality	of	governance	will	be	measured	by	identifying	the	level	of	poverty,	corruption,	
political	and/or	ethnic	rivalry/violence	and	civil	liberties	(Worldwide	Governance	Indicators,	
World	Bank;	Menard	&	Weill,	2016).	I	will	then	discuss	the	political	stability	of	the	country	by	
focusing	on	the	level	and	frequency	of	violence	since	the	end	of	colonization.	Thus,	I	will	
characterize	as	politically	unstable	a	country	where	various	of	the	next	factors	have	frequently	
occurred	since	the	independence	of	the	country:	coup	d’états,	civil	conflicts,	genocide,	change	
in	political	regime	and	government.	For	each	country,	we’ll	be	able	to	see	if	the	theory,	
	 16	
according	to	which	foreign	aid	impacts	the	quality	of	governance,	and	by	doing	so,	leads	to	
political	instability,	applies	to	these	cases	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	2004	;	Svensson,	2000;	Xu,	
2011).	
	
								Concerning	the	choice	of	these	four	countries,	in	order	to	not	be	biased	by	the	different	
levels	of	violence	between	African	countries	and	their	European	colonizer	during	the	
decolonization	process,	I	chose	four	African	countries	who	gained	their	independence	avoiding	
violent	conflicts	with	European	powers.	Indeed,	the	first	country	studied	in	this	work,	Rwanda,	
became	independent	from	the	Belgian	Empire	in	January	1961.	Even	if	this	independence	came	
with	a	rise	in	ethnic	tensions	between	the	two	major	ethnic	groups	of	the	country,	we	observe	
a	relative	peaceful	transfer	of	power	between	the	colonizer	and	the	soon	to	be	autonomous	
state.	Congo,	from	what	will	soon	emerge	The	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	is	another	
country	that	became	free	from	the	Belgian	rules.	Just	as	Rwanda,	it	also	obtained	its	
independence	relatively	peacefully	as	Congo	will	become	independent	in	less	than	six	months.	
Botswana	for	its	part,	officially	gained	independence	from	British	rule	In	September	of	1966,	
only	two	years	after	the	British	government	agreed	to	the	creation	of	an	autonomous	state	of	
Botswana,	through	a	democratic	process,	in	1964.	The	fourth	and	last	case	studied	in	section	8	
of	this	paper,	Gabon,	also	gained	its	independence	avoiding	violent	conflict	with	the	French	
empire.	Indeed,	following	the	failure	of	the	Indochina	experience,	the	French	government,	
being	more	and	more	pressured	by	its	African	colonies,	agreed	to	abandon	its	politic	of	
assimilation	and	started	the	process	of	decolonization,	notably	under	the	governance	of	Charles	
de	Gaulle,	principal	French	actor	in	the	decolonization	process.	After	progressively	obtaining	
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independent	institutions	such	as	a	legislative	assembly	as	well	as	an	executive	council	in	1957,	
Gabon	officially	gained	its	independence	in	1961,	with	Leon	Mba	as	first	Gabonese	president.	
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4. 	A	Case	Study	Analysis	of	Rwanda	
								Rwanda’s	first	encounter	with	a	European	power	occurred	in	1897	when	the	German	
troops	invaded	and	claimed	the	Rwandese	territory	as	its	own,	following	the	death	of	the	
Rwandese	king	in	1895.	Rwanda	and	Burundi	then	became	one	single	colony,	renamed	Ruanda-
Urundi	by	the	new	German	colons.		
	
								The	German’s	rule	over	the	Ruanda-Urundi	territory	would	not	last	very	long	since	the	
outbreak	of	World	War	I	changed	the	political	repartition	of	the	world,	as	well	as	the	European	
colonial	rule	over	Africa.	Thus,	following	the	German	invasion	over	Belgium	in	1914,	Belgian	
troops	invaded	the	German	territory	of	Ruanda-Urundi	and	incorporated	it	into	their	own	
colonial	territories.	Rwanda	then	became	a	Belgian	colony	and	would	stay	under	Belgian	
administration	until	its	independence	in	1962.	Indeed,	contrary	to	the	indirect	German’s	rule,	
where	most	of	the	ruling	was	left	to	local	rulers,	the	Belgian’s	rule	over	Ruanda-Urundi	would	
be	different	from	the	previous	one	and	would	have	a	bigger	impact	on	the	Rwandese	society.	
Whilst	Belgium	was	governing	Ruanda-Urundi	and	Congo,	its	rule	was	very	different	in	the	two	
colonies.	Whilst	the	administration	of	Congo	was	mainly	decided	in	Brussels,	the	Belgians	would	
principally	base	their	rule	of	Ruanda	Burundi	on	the	ethnic	divisions	between	the	two	main	
ethnic	groups	of	the	country,	the	Hutus	(majoritarian	in	Rwanda)	and	the	Tutsi,	emphasizing	
their	preference	for	the	Tutsi	community	that	they	considered	to	be	more	similar	to	Europeans.	
By	delegating	their	power	to	the	Tutsi	to	lead	the	country,	and	giving	them	a	superiority	over	
the	Hutus,	the	colonizers	played	a	major	role	in	the	outbreak	of	civil	war	and	the	genocide	of	
the	Tutsi	by	the	Hutus	a	few	decades	later.	Rwanda	obtained	its	independence	in	1962,	
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following	the	Rwandan	Revolution,	with	the	Hutus	on	one	side,	asking	for	a	transfer	of	power	
from	Tutsi	to	Hutus,	and	the	Tutsi	trying	to	maintain	their	dominance	in	the	country’s	
administration	and	government.	The	Rwandan	revolution	ended	with	Rwanda’s	independence	
and	the	transition	to	a	republic,	governed	by	the	majority	Hutu	with	the	election	of	the	Hutu	
president,	Gregoire	Kayibanda,	as	first	president	of	the	Republic	of	Rwanda.	
							4.1.	Foreign	Aid	and	Governance	
								After	the	proclamation	of	independence	in	July	1st	of	1962,	Rwanda	was	governed	by	the	
newly	elected	president	Grégoire	Kayibanda	who	had	the	task	of	economically	and	politically	
reconstructing	the	country	after	several	decades	of	colonization	which	had	left	the	newly	
autonomous	country	with	weak	institutions,	economy	and	government.	To	overcome	these	
challenges,	as	well	as	the	rise	in	ethnic	tensions	between	the	Hutus	and	Tutsis,	the	newly	
elected	government	was	helped	by	external	factors,	such	as	foreign	aid	targeted	towards	
development	ends	(Curtis,	2015).	The	goal	of	this	foreign	aid	was	to	promote	and	help	
development	and	welfare	in	underdeveloped	countries	(OECD	website).	In	2014,	the	Rwandese	
government	received	1024	million	dollars	of	this	development	aid.	Between	1970	and	1979,	an	
annual	average	of	262	million	dollars,	440	million	for	the	years	preceding	the	civil	war,	an	
annual	average	of	625	million	dollars	during	and	after	the	civil	war	(from	1990	to	1999),	and	an	
amount	of	aid	that	went	up	to	1086	billion	dollars	in	2013	(OECD	report,	2016).	
								As	discussed	above,	development	aid	has	played	a	major	role	in	the	country’s	economy	
reconstruction	(Curtis,	2015).	To	study	the	relationship	between	this	foreign	aid,	perceived	by	
Rwanda,	and	its	relationship	with	the	country’s	stability,	I	will	now	focus	the	discussion	on	
governance	to	see	if	the	amount	of	aid	received	by	Rwanda	has	affected	the	quality	of	
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governance	and	the	political	stability	of	the	country.	According	to	both	sides	of	the	theory	
discussed	in	the	method	section,	an	increase	in	the	amount	of	aid	should	either	lead	to	an	
amelioration	of	the	quality	of	governance	(Manning	&	Malbrough,	2014;	Yontcheva	&	Masud,	
2005),	or	on	the	opposite,	leading	to	an	ineffective	system	of	governance	(Easterly,	2001;	
Moyo,	2009).		
	
								In	the	case	of	Rwanda,	I	measured	the	quality	of	governance	by	discussing	the	level	of	
poverty,	corruption,	political	rivalry/violence	as	well	as	civil	liberties	since	the	70’s	(Worldwide	
Governance	Indicators,	World	Bank;	Menard	&	Weill,	2016).		
Concerning	the	level	of	poverty,	Rwanda	has	seen	an	increase	in	its	economic	growth	since	the	
end	of	the	genocide	of	1994	(Caplan,	2007),	however	the	level	of	poverty	is	still	very	high	in	a	
country	where	there	is	a	distinct	increase	in	the	gap	between	the	ruling	elites	and	the	
population.	Thus,	according	to	the	human	development	index	(UNDP	website),	the	life	
expectancy	of	Rwanda’s	population	and	Rwanda’s	GDP	hasn’t	increased	in	the	post-civil	war	
era,	but	instead	it	has	come	back	to	its	pre-civil	war	levels,	with	a	life	expectancy	of	39	years	
and	a	majority	of	the	population	living	on	less	than	a	dollar	per	day	(Caplan,	2007).	In	other	
words,	whilst	Rwanda	has	received	an	increasing	amount	of	development	aid,	and	has	seen	an	
increase	in	its	economic	growth,	the	poverty	problem	among	the	population	has	not	yet	been	
resolved.	
	
								The	next	factors	that	will	be	analyzed	in	the	focus	on	Rwanda’s	governance	are	civil	
liberties	and	political	rivalry/violence.	Whilst	Rwanda,	and	Rwanda	alone,	found	a	solution	to	
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end	the	genocide	in	1994,	with	an	international	community	who	didn’t	get	involved	to	stop	the	
conflict	or	engage	negotiations	for	peace	between	the	Hutus	and	Tutsis	(Uvin,	2011),	the	
country	is	still	far	from	offering	efficient	civil,	political	and	human	rights	(McDoom,	2012).	The	
country	disregarded	all	civil	liberties	during	the	genocide	of	1994,	through	the	systematic	
elimination	of	a	part	of	the	population	based	on	their	affiliation	to	the	Tutsi	group,	however	
Rwanda	is	still	criticized	today	for	its	bad	results	in	terms	of	civil	and	political	liberties	(Kiai	UN	
report,	UN	2014).	Despite	Rwanda	having	the	most	female	parliamentarians	in	the	world,	it	is	
also	known	for	its	high	percentage	of	authoritarian	repression	against	the	media	and	opposing	
political	groups,	and	the	country	has	also	been	criticized	for	suspicions	of	irregularities	during	
past	presidential	elections	(McDoom,	2012).	Indeed,	Rwanda	has	been	criticized	for	the	
decrease	in	political	freedom,	as	well	as	the	authoritarian	government’s	control	over	
independent	media	channels	(McDoom,	2012).	Additionally,	Rwanda	is	criticized	for	how	the	
Rwandese	president,	Paul	Kagame,	has	dealt	with	his	political	opposition,	with	most	opposition	
group	leaders	being	forced	into	exile	or	are	in	prison	(Kiai	UN	report,	2014).	According	to	the	
American	non-governmental	organization	“Freedom	in	the	World”	which	measures	the	degree	
of	political	and	civil	liberties	across	the	globe,	Rwanda	scores	6	on	the	scale,	with	a	score	of	1	
representing	the	most	free	countries	and	7	for	the	least	free.	Paul	Kagame	is	not	the	only	
Rwandese	president	to	be	associated	with	a	decrease	in	civil	and	political	liberties.	Grégoire	
Kayibanda,	first	president	of	the	Republic	of	Rwanda,	played	a	major	role	in	the	genocide,	by	
violating	the	Tutsi	civil	rights	and	removing	them	from	official	functions	such	as	education	
(Newbury,	1998).		
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								Concerning	the	level	of	corruption	within	the	Rwandese	government,	Rwanda	is	
surprisingly	not	the	worst	African	country	in	term	of	corruption,	compared	to	the	amount	of	
foreign	aid	it	has	received	within	the	years.	Indeed,	according	to	the	2017	Corruption	
Perceptions	Index	(Transparency	International),	Rwanda	is	the	48	least	corrupted	country,	out	
of	175	countries,	with	a	score	of	55/100	with	0	for	highly	corrupted	countries	and	100	
representing	no	corruption.	If	corruption	still	exists,	it	is	relatively	low	compared	to	other	
African	states,	notably	due	to	the	efficiency	of	the	Rwandese	government’s	transparency	
concerning	the	government	budget	(Bigsten	&	Lundström,	2004).			
							4.2.	Political	stability	since	1962	
								Even	though	the	first	Republic	of	Rwanda	is	proclaimed	in	January	1961,	the	official	
independence	date	is	decided	by	the	UN	for	July	1st	of	1962.	Following	the	first	presidential	
election	in	the	newly	independent	country,	Grégoire	Kayibanda	became	the	first	president	of	
the	Rwandese	Republic.	Even	though	Rwanda	obtained	its	independence	avoiding	violent	
conflicts	with	its	former	Belgian	colonizer,	the	colonial	legacy	left	Rwanda	with	a	strongly	
divided	country,	based	on	ethnicity	affiliation	(Caplan,	2007).	After	the	election	of	a	Hutu	
president,	Rwanda	has	been	described	as	an	authoritarian	country,	with	an	increase	in	ethnic	
violence	from	the	newly	elected	government	toward	the	Tutsi	minority,	as	well	as	attacks	from	
exiled	Tutsi	who	had	fled	the	country	several	years	earlier.	An	example	of	this	was	a	tentative	
coup	d’état	in	1964,	when	groups	of	Tutsi	attempt	to	invade	the	country	and	overthrow	
Kayibanda’s	regime,	which	failed	and	resulted	in	the	execution	of	several	Tutsi	government’s	
members,	as	well	as	Tutsi	citizens	(Curtis,	2015).	After	11	years	in	power,	Gregoire	Kayibanda	
was	overthrown	in	1973	after	a	Coup	d’état	by	Juvénal	Habyarimana,	whose	new	political	
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movement,	the	National	Revolutionary	Party	for	Development,	became	the	only	party	in	the	
political	sphere	of	Rwanda	for	the	next	20	years	(Curtis,	2015).	Habyarimana’s	governance	was	
very	controlling	on	the	local	level,	which	lead	to	social	protests	(Newbury,	1998).	Thus,	the	
period	of	time	between	the	arrival	at	the	head	of	the	government	of	Habyarimana	in	1973	and	
the	beginning	of	the	civil	war	in	1990	was	decisive	in	the	outbreak	of	the	genocide	in	April	1994	
(Newbury,	1998).	Whilst	a	growing	number	of	the	Rwandese	population	started	to	show	
discontent	with	the	governance	of	the	country	(Caplan,	2007),	Rwanda	saw	a	rise	in	social	
protest	that	weakened	the	government’s	authority	in	the	country.	This	decrease	of	the	regime	
authority	over	the	population	lead	to	the	outbreak	of	the	civil	war	in	1990,	with	the	president	
accusing	the	Tutsi	of	organizing	a	coup	d’état	to	overthrow	the	government	and	reestablish	a	
Tutsi	dominant	state	(1998).	This	intra	state	rise	in	tension	lead	to	the	civil	war	and	numerous	
protest	that	followed	by	the	arrest	of	thousands	of	Tutsi	as	well	as	moderate	Hutus	hostile	to	
the	government.	The	civil	war	lead	Habyarimana	to	sign	the	Arusha	Accords	on	August	4th1993,	
stating	a	peace	agreement	between	the	government	and	the	Tutsi	political	rebel	group,	the	
Rwandan	Patriotic	Front.		
								Whilst	the	country	was	just	starting	to	implement	the	conditions	discussed	in	the	Arusha	
Accords,	among	which	the	sharing	of	power	between	the	government	and	the	RPF,	in	other	
words	the	sharing	of	power	between	Hutus	and	Tutsi,	Habyrarimana’s	plane	was	shot	down	on	
April	6,	1994.	This	incident	plunged	the	country	into	civil	war	as	the	Tutsi	were	accused	of	being	
the	authors	of	the	attack	(Caplan,	2007).	This	genocide,	perpetrated	by	extremist	Hutus	against	
Tutsi	cost	the	lives	of	approximately	1	million	Rwandese,	Tutsi	and	moderate	Hutus.		
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After	the	end	of	the	genocide,	and	the	victory	of	the	Rwandan	Patriotic	front,	who	took	control	
of	the	country,	Rwanda	entered	in	a	new	era,	and	had	to	learn	how	to	live	with	each	other.	In	
July	1994,	the	country	was	completely	destroyed,	as	much	politically	than	socially,	with	
Rwandese	Tutsi	who,	if	they	survived,	were	displaced	by	millions	everywhere	in	Rwanda	and	in	
the	neighboring	states.	The	challenges	that	faced	the	new	government,	led	by	the	newly	
elected	Rwandese	president	Pasteur	Bizimungu,	were	consequent,	and	created	a	situation	of	
high	dependence	on	foreign	aid,	essential	in	order	to	reconstruct	the	country	(Caplan,	2017).	
Even	though	Rwanda	has	been	politically	stable	since	1994,	with	the	end	of	the	genocide,	and	
has	avoided	another	ethnic	conflict,	its	system	of	governance	has	been	firmly	criticized,	notably	
for	the	violation	of	civil	and	political	rights,	as	well	the	oppression	of	the	press.	Indeed,	since	
the	election	of	Paul	Kagame	in	2000,	numerous	political	opponents	have	been	incarcerated	and	
the	freedom	of	the	press	has	been	extremely	controlled	(Kiai	UN	report,	2014).		
	
								To	summarize,	even	if	Rwanda	was	already	receiving	an	important	amount	of	development	
aid	in	the	decades	preceding	the	genocide	(Curtis,	2015),	it	did	not	helped	to	avoid	the	civil	
conflict.	Rwanda	is	a	complex	case	to	study	in	the	context	of	this	paper	since	it’s	hard	to	qualify	
the	Rwandese	government	as	inefficient	or	efficient.	Indeed,	whilst	Rwanda	has	avoided	other	
internal	conflict	since	1994,	has	increased	its	economic	growth	(Curtis,	2015)	and	has	a	
corruption	level	lower	than	various	other	African	countries	(Bigsten	&	Lundström,	2004),	it	is	
still	among	the	worst	countries	in	terms	of	civil	and	political	liberties,	and	almost	two	third	of	
the	Rwandese	population	lives	in	extreme	poverty	(Caplan,	2007).	Moreover,	it	is	important	to	
distinguish	Rwanda	political	stability,	due	to	the	strong	leadership	of	Paul	Kigame,	as	well	as	an	
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increase	in	the	economic	growth,	with	democratization.	Thus,	Rwanda	is	still	far	from	being	an	
example	of	democracy.	Overall,	with	a	civil	war,	a	genocide,	civil	and	political	liberties	not	
respected	as	well	as	the	high	level	of	poverty,	Rwanda	supports	the	theory	that	a	consequent	
amount	of	development	aid	leads	to	political	instability.		
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5. A	Case	Study	Analysis	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	
								The	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	became	a	Belgian	territory	in	October	1908,	after	the	
Belgian	parliament	voted	to	annex	the	African	state	as	a	part	of	the	Belgian	colonial	empire.	
The	Belgian	colonizers	opted	for	a	direct	system	of	governance	over	their	Congolese	colony.	
Thus,	both	the	executive	and	legislative	powers	depended	on	the	Colonial	Council	and	the	
Belgian	parliament,	both	in	Brussels.	The	Congo	National	Movement,	created	in	1958	by	Patrice	
Lumumba,	would	become	the	foundation	of	the	upcoming	Congolese	independency.	After	
various	social	protests	asking	for	independency,	notably	in	Kinshasa	(former	name	Leopoldville)	
in	January	1959,	where	several	protesters	lost	their	life	after	altercations	with	the	Belgian	
troops.	Even	though	the	path	to	independency	cost	the	life	of	a	few	Congolese	demonstrators,	
the	Congolese	independency,	in	overall,	took	place	in	a	relatively	peaceful	atmosphere,	
compared	to	other	African	colonies	such	as	Algeria,	where	the	war	for	independency	against	
the	French	forces	lasted	several	years.		
								Aware	of	the	discontentment	and	the	desire	of	independency	among	the	Congolese	
population,	and	in	order	to	avoid	a	destructive	war	for	both	side	like	in	Algeria,	the	Belgian	
administration,	with	at	its	head	the	King	Baudouin	of	Belgium,	agreed	to	the	terms	of	a	
Congolese	independence.	Contrary	to	their	former	colonizers’	will	to	spread	the	process	of	
independence	of	Congo	on	two	or	three	years,	the	Congolese	representatives	obtained	the	
independence	of	their	country	within	the	following	six	months,	and	an	official	date	for	Congo’s	
independence	was	set	on	June	30,	1960.		
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							5.1.	Foreign	Aid	and	Governance	
								After	the	proclamation	of	independence	in	June	30th	of	1960,	the	newly	independent	state	
of	Congo	was	governed	by	the	president	Joseph	Kasavubu,	elected	by	the	Congolese	
parliament.	The	first	president	of	the	Republic	of	the	Congo	had	to	now	economically	and	
politically	reconstruct	the	country	after	several	decades	of	colonization	that	let	the	newly	
autonomous	country	with	weak	institutions,	economy	and	government	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	
2004).		
	
								To	overcome	these	new	challenges	and	put	his	country	on	the	path	of	development	and	
economic	growth,	Kasavubu	was	helped	by	external	factors	such	has	development	aid.	Just	like	
with	the	Rwandan	example	discussed	above,	this	type	of	aid	was	created	by	the	international	
community	to	ensure	and	promote	the	welfare	of	under	developed	countries.	Official	
Development	Aid	is	a	term	used	by	the	Development	Assistance	Committee	and	refer	to	the	
type	of	aid	received	by	under	developed	states	to	help	develop	the	welfare	of	the	country,	in	
other	words,	the	economic	growth	and	the	quality	of	governance.		
	
								The	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	is	among	the	African	states	receiving	the	most	
development	aid	(OECD	report,	2016).	Thus,	in	2014,	the	RDC	received	an	amount	of	2373	
million	dollars	of	development	aid.	2898	million	dollars	in	2012,	and	3392	million	average	
between	2010	and	2014.	Congo	was	already	one	of	the	major	recipient	country	when	it	comes	
to	development	aid,	since	it	received	an	average	of	784	million	dollars	a	year	between	1970	and	
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1979,	following	the	creation	of	the	Official	Development	Assistance	(ODA)	in	1969	by	the	DAC	
(Development	Assistance	Committee,	2016).		
	
								To	highlight	the	relationship	between	the	development	aid	perceived	by	the	Democratic	
Republic	of	Congo,	and	its	relationship	with	the	country’s	political	stability,	I	will	now	focus	the	
discussion	on	governance	to	see	if	the	quality	of	governance	illustrates	the	amount	of	
development	aid	received	by	the	Congolese	government.	In	other	words,	if	an	important	
amount	of	aid	means	political	instability.	According	to	the	theory	discussed	in	the	method	
section,	an	increase	in	the	amount	of	aid	should:	lead	to	a	bad	and	ineffective	governance	
(Easterly,	2001;	Moyo,	2009).	I	will	measure	the	quality	of	governance	by	discussing	the	level	of	
poverty,	corruption,	political	rivalry/violence	as	well	as	civil	liberties	since	the	70’s	(Worldwide	
Governance	Indicators,	World	Bank;	Menard	&	Weill,	2016).		
	
								Concerning	the	level	of	poverty,	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	is	among	the	world’s	
poorest	countries.	Almost	70%	of	the	Congolese	population	live	in	poverty,	with	a	Human	
Development	Index	of	0.304	in	2012	(Tshibungu	&	Schneider,	2014).	Despite	a	decrease	in	
poverty	in	the	last	decades,	the	RDC	still	ranks	176	out	of	186	countries	according	to	the	Human	
Development	Index	(UN	report,	2015).	Disparities	exist	within	the	Congolese	territory,	since	
some	regions	have	better	results	in	term	of	poverty	percentage.	Even	if	the	western	region	of	
Congo,	for	example,	has	seen	a	better	economic	growth	within	the	past	few	years	as	well	as	a	
poverty	level	inferior	to	the	one	in	other	regions	(Munganga,	2017),	RDC	in	overall,	is	still	facing	
economic	problems,	since	there	has	been	no	significant	economic	growth	even	with	the	
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establishment	of	development	aid.	This	stagnation	is	due	to	the	country’s	inefficient	system	of	
governance,	with	a	Congolese	government	that	has	used	the	benefits	from	internal	resources	
as	well	as	the	received	foreign	aid	towards	personal	ends,	accentuating	the	inequalities	
between	the	country’s	elites	and	the	population	(Matti,	2010).		
	
								Thus,	corruption	has	often	been	at	the	center	of	Congo’s	politics.	Indeed,	it	has	been	
noticed	that	the	level	of	poverty	among	the	Congolese	population,	with	more	than	half	of	the	
population	who	lives	with	less	than	dollars	a	day,	is	contradictory	in	a	country	that	is	known	for	
its	internal	wealth	(gold,	diamonds	etc.)	(A2	Global	Risk	Report,	2017;	United	Nations,	2001	
a,b).	Whilst	Congo	is	a	land	of	highly	valuable	natural	resources	(Olson	&	Congdon,	2004),	only	
a	small	part	of	the	population	benefits	from	these	resources.		
	
								The	Transparency	International	organization,	a	society	that	fights	against	corruption	on	a	
global	scale,	has	ranked	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	at	the	147th	place,	in	a	total	of	168	
countries.	On	a	scale	from	0	for	a	very	low	level	of	corruption,	to	100	for	an	extreme	level	of	
corruption,	the	RDC	presets	the	score	of	22	(level	of	corruption	very	high),	with	an	average	
among	African	countries	of	33,	still	according	to	the	transparency	International	organization	
(OFPRA	report,	2016).	The	IMF	measures	the	level	of	corruption	by	the	frequency	a	company	
has	to	pay	a	bribe	to	the	authorities	of	the	country.	The	results	show	a	44%	of	corruption	in	the	
RDC,	compared	to	the	average	of	20,4%	for	the	African	continent	(OPRA	report,	2016).		
Various	NGO’s	as	well	as	journalists	and	politicians	have	denounced	the	corruption	at	the	
political	level	in	RDC.	Among	them,	the	Congolese	senator	Jacques	N’Djoli	who	has	denounced	
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the	level	of	corruption	in	Congo,	and	argued	that	the	country	loses	15	billion	dollars	every	year	
in	corruption	(Kandolo,	2015).	Thus,	55%	of	the	government	budget	“disappears”	each	year,	
what	has	a	consequent	impact	on	the	economic	growth,	by	negatively	impacting	investments	
and	the	infrastructures’	development	(Kodila,	2012).		
	
								The	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	is	also	amongst	the	worst	African	countries	when	it	
comes	to	the	respect	of	civil	and	political	rights.	Thus,	Congo	has	been	criticized	for	the	non-
respect	of	civil	rights	and	complete	repression	on	any	political	opposition.	Many	democracy	and	
human	right	activists,	as	well	as	members	of	opposing	political	groups	have	been	incarcerated	
in	jail	without	any	access	to	justice	or	trial	to	defend	themselves.	The	Freedom	of	the	Press	has	
also	been	extremely	restricted,	practically	non-existent,	with	an	almost	complete	control	of	the	
medias	as	well	as	a	governmental	control	over	text	messaging,	the	access	to	internet	and	the	
international	researcher’s	community	(Sawyer,	2018).	An	example	of	this	governmental	control	
over	information	is	the	expulsion	of	two	researchers	of	the	Global	Witness	organization,	
expulsed	from	Congo	in	2016	while	they	were	investigating	potential	suspicion	of	corruption	
among	the	Congolese	government	(OPRA	report,	2016).	These	poor	results	in	the	respect	of	
civil	and	political	liberties	over	the	years	have	put	the	RDC	among	the	worst	countries	according	
to	the	Freedom	House	(Freedom	in	the	World	report,	2018).	On	a	scale	of	7,	with	7	
representing	the	least	free	and	1	the	most	free,	political	rights	in	Congo	are	rated	with	a	7	and	
civil	liberties	a	6,	what	highlights	the	extreme	repression	and	corruption	among	the	Congolese	
government.	
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							5.2.	Political	Stability	Since	1960	
								Even	though	the	independence	of	Congo	was	decided	in	Brussels	in	January	1960,	the	
official	independence	date	was	set	up	for	June	30th	of	1960,	with	the	first	free	governmental	
elections	decided	for	May	of	the	same	year.	Following	the	first	presidential	election	in	the	
newly	independent	country,	Joseph	Kasavubu	becomes	the	first	elected	president	of	the	newly	
Congolese	Republic,	with	Patrice	Lumumba	as	prime	minister.	Even	though	Congo	obtained	its	
independence	avoiding	violent	conflicts	with	its	former	Belgian	colonizer,	its	independence	was	
immediately	followed	by	various	political	crisis,	a	political	stability	that	still	occurs	today	
(Sawyer,	2018).		
	
								The	first	political	crisis	occurred	from	1960	to	1965,	with	the	rebellion	of	both	Katanga	and	
South	Kasai,	two	Congolese	provinces	fighting	for	secessionist	ends,	and	which	played	a	major	
role	in	the	outbreak	of	the	internal	conflict,	since	this	rebellion	lead	to	a	crisis	between	the	
president	and	the	prime	minister,	followed	by	the	removal	from	power	of	the	prime	minister	
Patrice	Lumumba,	who	will	then	be	executed	by	the	Katangan	authorities.	This	crisis	came	to	an	
end	in	1963	after	the	involvement	of	UN	troops.	1965	marked	the	start	of	a	new	political	crisis	
in	Congo	with	a	coup	d’état,	organized	by	Joseph	Mobutu,	who,	supported	by	the	USA	and	
Belgium,	successfully	overthrew	Kasavubu’s	government	and	became	the	country’s	leader.	
Following	his	coup,	Mobutu	renamed	the	country	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	following	a	
referendum,	before	changing	the	name	again	to	“Republic	of	Zaire”.	Mobutu	stayed	in	power	
during	three	decades,	supported	by	the	US	as	a	tool	against	the	expansion	of	communism	in	
Africa	during	the	Cold	War	(Berwouts,	2009).	Mobutu’s	ruling	is	infamous	for	the	extreme	level	
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of	corruption	among	the	government,	as	well	as	the	violations	of	civil	right,	with	the	repression	
and	neutralization	of	most	of	his	political	opponents	and	the	establishment	of	a	single	party	
politics.	The	amount	of	international	aid	received	during	this	time	period,	mostly	through	loans,	
was	used	for	personal	ends,	and	lead	to	a	decrease	of	the	country’s	infrastructures.	This	high	
degree	of	corruption	among	Mobutu’s	government	lead	to	a	cancellation	of	development	aid	
sent	by	Belgium	in	1969	(Naniuzeyi,	1999),	as	well	social	riots	among	the	population.	Following	
the	decrease	in	power	and	influence	of	the	Soviet	Union,	Mobutu	was	“politically	abandoned”	
by	the	US	who	was	left	as	the	single	major	power.	Without	the	financial	and	political	support	
from	the	US,	Mobutu,	under	the	social	pressure,	agreed	to	form	a	transitional	and	coalition	
government,	and	created	the	third	Republic	in	order	to	put	the	country	on	the	democratic	path.	
However,	Mobuntu	stayed	in	power,	establishing	authoritarian	reforms	and	repression,	until	
1997	when	he	was	forced	to	flee	the	country,	following	the	outbreak	of	the	first	Congo	War	in	
1996	and	the	seizure	of	power	by	Laurent-Desiré	Kabila,	a	member	of	the	opposition	helped	by	
Rwandan	and	Ugandan	Tutsi	groups,	as	new	president	of	what	was	renamed	the	Democratic	
Republic	of	Congo.	1998	marked	the	beginning	of	the	Second	Congo	War,	after	the	invasion	of	
RDC	by	rebels	backed	up	by	Ugandan	and	Rwandan	troops,	to	accentuate	the	influence	of	these	
countries	in	RDC.	While	the	rebels	took	control	of	most	of	the	east	of	RDC,	the	attack	was	
stopped	by	the	involvement	of	the	Zimbabwe,	Namibia	and	Angolan	troops	who	fought	
alongside	the	RDC	army	and	sided	with	Kabila.	
	
								Whilst	the	governments	involved	in	the	conflict	signed	a	cease	fire	in	July	1999,	peace	was	
not	fully	implemented	until	2003,	after	the	assassination	of	Laurent	Kabila	in	2001	and	the	will	
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of	his	successor,	his	son	Jospeh	Kabila	to	end	the	conflict,	by	calling	for	a	multilateral	peace	that	
resulted	in	the	establishment	of	a	transitional	government	in	2003.		
	
								Even	though	Jospeh	Kabila	organized	the	first	multi-party	elections	since	the	independence	
in	2006,	his	opponents	called	for	irregularities	in	the	results	of	the	elections.	Moreover,	his	
governance	was	marked	by	various	social	unrest	and	failed	coup	d’états	as	well	as	the	use	of	
violence	to	stop	any	opposition	manifestation,	that	led	to	a	lot	of	victims	among	the	Congolese	
population	as	well	as	the	increase	of	the	displaced	people.	This	governance	favored	the	
continuity	and	frequency	of	violence	and	political	instability	in	RDC.			
	
								Indeed,	to	conclude,	we	can	see	that	despite	the	consequent	amount	of	development	aid	
received	by	Congo	through	the	years,	with	RDC	being	one	of	the	biggest	African	recipient	of	
development	aid	(OECD	report,	2016),	the	country	is	still	amongst	the	worst	African	states	in	
terms	of	poverty,	corruption	and	civil/political	rights.	With	a	lot	of	this	aid,	as	well	as	the	gains	
from	the	various	natural	resources	of	the	country,	being	used	for	personal	use	by	the	elites	in	
the	government,	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	has	been	the	theatre	of	violence	between	
governmental	authorities	and	the	population,	as	well	as	violent	conflicts	between	rebel	groups,	
that	have	led	the	death	of	approximately	6	millions	of	Congolese	and	the	displacement	of	4.5	
million	people	within	the	past	decades,	with	the	Congolese	forces	accused	of	the	killing	of	
thousands	of	citizens	during	the	past	two	years	(Human	Rights	Watch	report,	2018).	Thus,	we	
can	argue	that	in	the	case	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	the	consequent	amount	of	
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development	aid	is	related	to	a	bad	quality	of	governance	and	to	an	extreme	political	
instability,	and	so,	the	RDC	supports	the	theory.		
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6. A	Case	Study	Analysis	of	Botswana	
								Botswana’s	first	encounter	with	the	European	colons	occurred	at	the	end	of	the	19th	
century	when	European	countries	divided	the	African	continent	among	themselves	as	part	of	
their	colonial	empire.	Botswana	became	a	part	of	the	Britain	colonial	empire	following	the	
Berlin	Conference	in	1884-1885,	where	the	division	of	Africa	was	established	and	made	official	
between	all	the	European	powers.	Botswana,	from	its	former	name	Bechuanaland,	one	of	the	
poorest	country	in	the	world	at	that	time,	became	a	British	protectorate.	Bechuanaland	was	
important	for	the	British	government	for	its	geographic	situation,	and	was	used	to	protect	the	
British	interest	in	South	Africa	(Tlou	&	Campbell,	1984).	As	a	protectorate	and	not	a	colony,	
Britain	neglected	Bechuanaland’s	development	within	the	years,	and	attempted	to	transfer	the	
administration	of	Bechuanaland	to	the	protectorate	of	Rhodesia	(today	Zimbabwe).	However,	
after	several	protests	from	the	population	in	Bechuanaland	against	their	potential	integration	
into	the	Union	of	South	Africa,	the	British	government	renounced	and	kept	Bechuanaland	
under	its	rule	and	protection	until	its	independence	in	1966.		
	
								Contrary	to	other	African	states	who	gained	their	independence	after	violent	fights	against	
their	European	colonizer,	Bechuanaland,	renamed	Botswana	after	its	independence	in	1966,	
obtained	its	independence	avoiding	the	use	of	force	against	the	British	forces	(Tlou	&	Campbell,	
1984).	Led	by	the	Botswana	Democratic	Party,	Botswana	earned	its	independence	in	1966	after	
negotiations	with	the	British	Empire	started	in	1964,	when	Britain	agreed	for	a	democratic,	self-
government	in	Botswana,	with	Seretse	Khama	elected	first	president	of	the	newly	independent	
country	of	Botswana.		
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							6.1.	Foreign	Aid	and	Governance	
								After	the	proclamation	of	independence	in	September	30th	of	1966,	the	new	independent	
state	of	Botswana	was	governed	by	the	newly	elected	president	Seretse	Khama,	one	of	the	
political	leaders	who	led	Botswana	to	the	path	to	independency.	The	first	president	of	
Botswana	faced	new	challenges,	notably	to	economically	and	politically	reconstruct	the	country	
after	several	decades	of	European’s	rule	over	the	country.		
	
								Contrary	to	Rwanda	and	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	discussed	above,	Botswana	is	
among	the	African	countries	that	received	the	least	development	aid.	Whilst	the	DRC	received	
an	amount	of	2373	million	dollars,	and	Rwanda	1024	million	dollars	of	development	aid	in	
2014,	Botswana	for	its	part	“only”	received	99	million	dollars	(OECD	report,	2016).	
To	test	the	hypothesis	discussed	in	the	method	section,	according	to	which	important	amount	
of	foreign	aid	is	related	to	the	political	instability	of	the	recipient	country	by	impacting	the	
quality	of	its	governance	(Easterly,	2001;	Moyo,	2009),	I	will	now	discuss	the	relation	between	
foreign	aid,	political	stability,	and	the	quality	of	governance,	in	two	countries	that	have	received	
an	amount	of	development	aid	inferior	to	the	African	average	(less	than	1000	million	dollars	a	
year).	The	last	section	of	this	paper	will	compare	the	results	between	the	two	countries	that	
received	an	important	amount	of	foreign	aid	(Rwandese	and	RDC)	and	the	two	countries	that	
received	an	average	amount	of	development	aid	inferior	to	the	African	average	(Botswana	and	
Gabon).		
	
								The	first	indicator	to	measure	the	quality	of	governance	in	Botswana	is	poverty.	
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Since	the	end	of	colonization	in	1966,	Botswana	has	been	an	example	in	terms	of	development.	
Indeed,	Botswana	has	had	the	highest	economic	growth	in	the	world	following	its	
independence	from	the	British	rule	(Acemoglu	et	al.,	2001),	with	an	average	annual	income	per	
habitant	that	has	increased	by	6.3%	for	the	time	period	between	1970	and	2000	(Kamrany	&	
Gray,	2012).	In	comparison,	developed	countries	like	European	countries	or	northern	American	
countries,	for	the	same	time	period,	have	had	an	average	annual	growth	of	1.8	%.	At	the	end	of	
the	19th	century,	Botswana	has	been	classified	by	the	World	Bank	as	an	upper	middle	income	
country.	Today,	development	aid	in	Botswana	only	accounts	for	3	percent	of	the	government	
budget,	while	the	economic	activity	is	expected	to	increase	by	almost	5%	by	2019.	(World	Bank	
report,	2018).	If	Botswana	has	seen	a	rapid	increase	in	economic	growth	and	in	the	
development	of	its	institutions,	inequalities	remains	among	the	Botswanans	population.	Thus,	
the	country	is	still	facing	important	level	of	poverty	and	inequality	among	its	population,	
especially	in	the	rural	regions,	with	children	representing	half	of	the	population	living	in	poverty	
(World	bank,	2015).	However,	even	though	the	country	is	still	struggling	with	high	level	of	
poverty,	there	has	been	a	reduction	in	the	poverty	level,	with	the	total	number	of	Botswanans	
people	living	in	poverty	that	was	divided	by	two	in	1985,	and	again	to	33%	in	1994	(Lewin,	
2011).		
	
								Concerning	the	civil	and	political	liberties	as	well	as	corruption,	Botswana	is	also	a	model	of	
success	in	post-colonial	Africa.	Whilst	numerous	African	countries	with	rich	natural	resources	
are	characterized	by	bad	governance	(Collier	&	Hoeffler,	2004),	Botswana,	due	to	the	respect	
for	human	rights	as	well	as	the	respect	of	the	rule	of	law,	established	by	the	government	since	
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the	independence	(Lewin,	2011).	A	high	level	of	transparency	as	well	as	the	importance	given	to	
the	consultation	of	the	institutions	(known	as	“kgotla”)	concerning	the	government	budget,	has	
ensured	Botswana	with	an	important	degree	of	trust	among	its	population	(Lewin,	2011).	
According	to	Transparency	International,	an	international	non-governmental	organization	that	
analyzes	and	calculates	the	level	of	corruption	among	countries,	Botswana	ranks	at	the	34th	
place,	with	a	score	of	61,	with	0	representing	highly	corrupted	countries	and	100	the	very	clean	
ones	(Transparency	International	report,	2017),	what	makes	it	the	least	corrupted	African	
nation	(Kamrany	&	Gray,	2012).		
	
								Concerning	the	respect	of	civil	liberties	as	well	as	political	freedom,	on	a	scale	from	1	(most	
free)	and	7	(least	free),	Botswana	obtains	the	score	of	3	for	the	respect	of	political	rights,	and	a	
score	of	2	in	civil	liberties,	with	an	average	of	freedom	rating	of	2.5	(Freedom	House	Report,	
2018).	Thus,	the	multi-party	political	system	has	been	very	respected	notably	through	the	
presence	of	opposition	politic	groups	and	their	active	participation	in	the	government.		
Whilst	some	medias	are	still	facing	pressure	from	the	government	today,	freedom	of	religion	as	
well	as	freedom	of	assembly	and	protesting	is,	in	overall,	respected	by	the	government	(2018).		
								6.2.	Political	Stability	since	1966	
								After	its	relatively	peaceful	independence	in	1966	from	the	British	rule	(Tlou	&	Campbell,	
1984),	Botswana	has	observed	a	relative	political	stability	by	maintaining	a	parliamentary	
democracy	since	its	independence,	and	whilst	democracy	is	not	perfect,	Botswana	has	been	an	
example	of	economic	growth,	development	and	political	stability,	by	providing	its	people	with	
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democratic	and	non-violent	elections,	contrary	to	other	African	countries	where	corrupted	
authoritarian	rulers	have	been	in	power	for	decades	(Naniuzeyi,	1999).	
	
								In	the	case	of	Botswana,	even	though	the	Botswana	Democratic	Party	has	been	in	power	
since	1966	and	the	declaration	of	independence,	the	government	has	established,	and	
respected,	presidential	elections	every	five	years.	The	low	level	of	corruption	within	the	
government,	the	respect	of	human	rights	and	the	respect	of	the	rule	of	law	have	avoided	social	
protest	or	coup	d’état	as	well	as	other	division	among	the	population.	The	reelection	of	the	
Botswana	Democratic	Party	every	five	years	has	happened	without	any	infraction	of	the	law,	
and	is	mainly	due	to	the	rural	support,	while	opposition	parties	(led	by	the	Botswana	National	
Front)	usually	have	more	votes	in	urban	areas	(Kiyaga,	1986).	Since	its	independence	in	1966,	
Botswana	was	governed	by	5	presidents,	all	of	them	elected	during	free	democratic	presidential	
elections.	The	current	president	of	the	Republic	of	Botswana	is	Mokgweetsi	Masisi,	elected	last	
May,	after	serving	four	years	in	the	previous	government	as	vice	president	and	education	
minister.		
	
								To	conclude,	we	can	see	that	despite	the	extremely	low	amount	of	development	aid	
received	by	Botswana	since	1966,	the	country	is	an	example	of	development,	economic	growth	
and	governance.	By	establishing	a	democratic	an	efficient	system	of	governance,	favoring	
economic	and	institutions	development,	that	led	to	an	annual	average	growth	superior	than	in	
any	other	African	country,	providing	services	that	are	normally	only	provided	in	developed	
countries	such	as	free	education	or	free	healthcare	(Kamrany	&	Gray,	2012),	and	by	a	level	of	
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corruption	that	ranked	Botswana	as	the	least	corrupted	African	state,	Botswana	has	known	
decades	of	political	stability,	due	to	this	strong	and	efficient	governance.	With	this	quality	of	
governance	and	the	small	amount	of	development	aid	received,	Botswana	supports	the	theory	
according	to	which	an	important	amount	of	foreign	aid	is	related	to	political	instability,	by	
illustrating	the	fact	that	countries	who	receive	an	amount	of	development	aid	lower	than	the	
African	average	are	more	politically	stable.		
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7. A	Case	Study	Analysis	of	Gabon	
								Gabon’s	first	encounter	with	a	European	power	occurred	in	the	15th	century	with	the	
arrival	of	Portuguese	on	the	Gabonese	coasts,	soon	followed	by	the	Dutch,	who	rapidly	started	
the	exploitation	of	the	Gabonese	natural	resources	as	well	as	the	slave	trade.	The	official	
colonization	of	the	country	progressively	happened	during	the	19th	century,	to	finally	officially	
become	a	part	of	the	French	colonial	empire	in	1886.	In	1910,	Gabon,	alongside	Chad,	the	
Central	African	Republic,	The	Republic	of	Congo	and	Cameroon,	formed	the	French	Equatorial	
Africa.	During	WWII,	a	battle	between	the	Free	French	Forces	and	the	pro	Vichy	forces	ended	
up	with	the	victory	of	the	Free	French	Forces	in	November	1940,	and	Gabon	became	a	strategic	
territory	for	the	Free	French	implantation	in	Africa.		
	
								In	1946,	Gabon	became	an	oversea	territory,	and	was	represented	in	the	French	
Parliament.	Following	the	failure	of	the	Indochina	experience,	the	French	government,	facing	
increasing	pressure	from	its	African	colonies,	agreed	to	abandon	its	politic	of	assimilation	and	
started	the	process	of	decolonization,	notably	under	the	governance	of	Charles	de	Gaulle,	
principal	French	actor	in	the	decolonization	process.	After	progressively	obtaining	independent	
institutions	such	as	a	legislative	assembly	as	well	as	an	executive	council	in	1957,	becoming	an	
autonomous	republic	within	the	French	community	in	1958,	Gabon	officially	gained	its	
independence	in	August	of	1960,	with	Leon	Mba	elected	as	first	Gabonese	president	in	1961.		
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							7.1.	Foreign	Aid	and	Governance	
								After	the	proclamation	of	independence	in	August	17th	of	1960,	the	new	independent	
state	of	Botswana	is	governed	by	the	newly	elected	president	Léon	M’ba.	The	first	president	of	
Gabon	faced	new	challenges,	notably	to	economically	and	politically	reconstruct	the	country	
after	several	decades	of	French’s	rule	over	the	country.	As	Botswana	discussed	above,	Gabon	is	
amongst	the	African	countries	that	received	the	least	development	aid	(annual	average	amount	
of	aid	below	1000	million	dollars	for	the	2010-2016	period).	Thus,	when	the	Democratic	
Republic	of	Congo	received	2898	million	dollars	of	aid	in	2012,	Gabon	was	receiving	an	amount	
of	75	million	dollars.	Even	in	the	first	years	following	the	creation	of	the	Official	Development	
Assistance	program	(ODA)	in	1969,	Gabon’s	average	amount	of	foreign	aid	was	lower	than	the	
African	average.	Whilst	countries	like	Tanzania	were	receiving	an	annual	average	of	857	million	
dollars	for	the	period	of	time	between	1970	and	1979,	Gabon	was	“only”	receiving	an	annual	
average	of	134	million	dollars	(OECD	report,	2016).		
	
								To	test	the	foreign	aid	and	political	stability	theory	discussed	in	the	method	section,	I	will	
now	discuss	the	quality	of	governance	in	Gabon	since	its	independence,	that	I’ll	measure	by	
discussing	the	level	of	poverty,	civil	and	political	liberties	as	well	as	the	level	of	corruption	since	
1960.	Despite	being	the	5th	largest	African	oil	producer,	almost	half	of	the	population	lives	
below	the	poverty	lines,	with	more	than	500,000	people	living	in	poverty.	(The	Borgen	Project	
report,	2017).	These	numbers	go	against	the	average	economic	growth	of	the	country	since	
Gabon	has	seen	an	increase	of	3%	at	the	beginning	of	the	21st	century.	When	it	comes	to	
human	development,	Gabon	ranks	93rd	out	of	169	countries,	what	is	below	the	average	of	other	
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countries	that	approximately	have	the	same	per	capita	income	(African	development	bank	
group	report,	2011).		
	
								Corruption	level	in	Gabon	remains	particularly	high,	with	a	110th	ranking	(out	of	178	
countries	by	the	Transparency	international	organization	(Transparency	International	report,	
2017).		Thus,	Gabon,	with	a	score	of	32	out	of	100	(with	0	for	highly	corrupted	and	100	very	
clean)	is	amongst	the	most	corrupted	countries.	Many	of	Gabon’s	economic	problems	are	due	
to	the	high	level	of	corruption	within	the	government	that	is	often	associated	with	corruption	
scandals.	An	example	of	this	governmental	corruption	is	the	trial	in	March	of	this	year	of	Blaise	
Wada,	former	project	coordinator	for	the	sanitation	of	the	capital	Libreville.	Wada	is	accused	of	
the	corruption	of	1.765	billion	of	Gabonese	franc	that	was	supposed	to	be	used	towards	
development	ends	and	that	have	been	used	for	his	personal	ends	(rfi	Afrique,	2018).		
Concerning	the	civil	and	political	rights,	Gabon	is	also	among	the	worst	countries.	Thus,	with	a	
score	from	1	for	the	most	free	countries,	to	7	for	the	least	free,	Congo’s	score	concerning	the	
respect	of	political	rights	is	7,	which	means	that	political	oppositions	is	not	tolerated	and	the	
repression	violent	against	opponents	to	the	government.	According	to	the	Freedom	House,	
Gabon’s	score	concerning	freedom	as	a	whole	is	of	6	out	of	7	(with	7	=	least	free)	(Freedom	in	
the	world	report,	2018).	These	results	give	us	an	overview	of	Gabon’s	political	and	social	
situation,	with	a	corrupted	government,	that	hides	behind	the	multiparty	elections	to	stay	in	
power	through	the	years.	Thus,	Ali	Bongo	Ondima	has	maintained	his	dominance	over	Gabon’s	
government	since	the	dead	of	his	father	in	2009.	With	a	quasi-total	control	of	the	press,	the		
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Control	and	repression	towards	his	opponents,	and	the	organization	of	controversial	elections,	
Ali	Bongo	has	been	ruling	over	a	state	that	has	looked	more	authoritarian	than	democratic,	
with	as	another	example	of	the	low	quality	of	governance,	the	abolition	of	the	presidential	term	
limits,	that	were	limited	to	5	years,	but	were	abolished	in	2003	by	Omar	Bongo	Ondimba.	
Compare	to	the	Botswanans	government,	the	Gabonese	government	for	its	part,	does	not	
operate	with	transparency	concerning	its	budget.	For	example,	between	2008	and	2014,	the	
presidency	budget	increased	by	1,073%	while	the	government	budget	only	increased	by	64%	
(Freedom	House	report,	2018).	This	high	level	of	corruption	has	led	to	various	social	protest	
that	have	been	violently	repressed	by	the	authorities.		
								7.2.	Political	Stability	since	1960	
								After	its	relatively	peaceful	independence	from	the	French	rule	in	1960,	Gabon	elected	its	
first	president,	Léon	M’ba,	with	Omar	bongo	Ondimba	as	vice	president	after	the	first	
independent	presidential	elections	in	1961.	Immediately	after	his	accession	to	power,	M’ba	
eliminated	the	liberty	of	the	press	as	well	political	opposition.	M’ba	also	attempted	to	dissolute	
the	national	assembly,	what	led	to	a	tentative	of	coup	d’état	by	the	Gabonese	army	to	
overthrow	M’ba.	The	tentative	failed	after	the	implication	of	the	French	troops	that	will	be	
send	to	support	and	help	M’ba	stay	in	power.	After	M’ba’s	death	in	1967,	Omar	Bongo,	vice	
president	under	M’ba	presidency,	became	president.	Following	Leon	Mba’s	authoritarian	
politics,	Bongo	established	his	new	party	the	Gabonese	Democratic	Party	as	the	only	political	
party	authorized.		
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								This	authoritarian	system	of	governance	and	the	low	level	of	respect	for	civil	and	political	
rights	led	to	various	social	protests	in	the	90’s	as	well	as	two	coup	d’états	that	failed.	Following	
the	presidential	elections	of	1993,	several	social	protests	occurred	in	the	country	to	denounce	
the	non-respect	the	law	during	the	elections	and	irregularities	in	the	results.	These	protests	met	
a	violent	repression	from	the	government	authorities,	that	then	agreed	to	work	with	the	
opposition	towards	an	appeasement	of	violence	in	the	country.	After	Bongo’s	death	in	2009,	he	
was	replaced	at	the	head	of	the	government	by	the	president	of	the	Senate	at	the	time,	Rose	
Francine	Rogombé,	who	became	in	charge	of	the	country	until	the	next	presidential	elections	
later	this	year,	that	proclaimed	Omar	Bongo’s	son	as	new	president	of	the	Gabonese	Republic.	
Just	like	his	father	before	him,	Ali	Bongo’s	election	was	denounced	by	his	opponents	as	
irregular,	what	led	to	violent	social	protests	where	several	Gabonese	people	lost	their	lives	
following	a	violent	military	repression.	The	presidential	elections	of	2016	led	to	even	more	
violent	social	unrest	than	for	the	election	of	Ali	Bongo	in	2009,	with	violent	altercations	
between	the	government	authorities	and	protesters	that	resulted	in	a	severe	repression	and	
many	deaths	among	the	population.		
	
								To	conclude,	Omar	Bongo	and	his	son	who	succeeded	him	had	a	strong	authoritarian	style	
of	leadership,	characterized	by	a	violent	repression	against	any	opposition	to	their	political	
party,	the	country	has	suffered	from	a	lack	of	freedom	of	press,	freedom	of	expression,	an	
absence	of	respect	for	civil	and	political	rights,	a	lack	of	transparency	when	it	comes	to	
government	budget,	and	all	these	factors	have	led	to	an	overall,	political	instability	in	in	Gabon	
since	its	impendence	in	1960.	Contrary	to	the	case	of	Botswana	discussed	above,	Gabon	
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illustrates	a	country	which,	even	when	receiving	an	amount	of	development	aid	lower	than	the	
African	average,	does	not	have	a	high-quality	governance	and	a	very	stable	political	
environment.	Gabon	is	a	difficult	case	in	the	context	of	this	study.	Whilst	it	cannot	be	defined	
as	a	politically	stable	country	like	Botswana,	it	cannot,	on	the	other	hand,	be	qualified	as	a	
country	that	is	as	politically	unstable	as	Rwanda	or	the	DRC.	By	avoiding	ethnic	conflicts	or	
genocide,	Gabon	is	more	stable	than	Rwanda	and	the	RDC	who	received	a	consequential	
amount	of	development	aid.	Whilst	Gabon	is	far	from	being	an	example	of	democracy,	it	has	
stayed	more	stable	than	Rwanda	and	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	where	either	
genocide,	civil	war,	or	both	occurred	in	the	years	following	independence.	However,	in	overall,	
Gabon	does	not	support	the	theory	that	foreign	aid	is	related	to	political	instability	and	so,	
countries	receiving	less	foreign	aid	are	more	likely	to	have	a	good	quality	governance	and	to	be	
political	stable.		
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8. Conclusion	
								The	aim	of	this	work	was	to	give	a	better	understanding	of	foreign	aid,	more	especially	
development	aid,	and	its	level	of	success	in	the	African	continent.	After	decades,	sometimes	
centuries,	of	colonization	by	European	powers,	newly	independent	African	states	are	left	with	a	
colonial	legacy	characterized	by	weak	institutions,	weak	governments	who	have	to	learn	to	
govern	for	themselves.	The	challenge	for	these	countries	is	to	find	their	place	on	the	
international	scene,	and	it	is	important	for	them	to	establish	new	autonomous	and	efficient	
institutions	that	will,	on	the	long	term,	bring	economic	growth	and	political	stability,	both	
essential	factors	in	the	development	of	a	country.	Unfortunately,	a	lot	of	African	countries,	
after	decades	of	colonization,	were	not	prepared	for	a	complete	political,	economic	and	
institutional	autonomy.	Indeed,	numerous	African	countries	came	out	of	the	decolonization	
process	with	very	weak	institutions,	what	led	to	weak	economies	and	unstable	governments.	
One	of	the	solution	to	overcome	these	problems	was	found	by	the	international	community,	
through	the	form	of	foreign	aid.	Thus,	since	the	end	of	colonization,	African	countries	have	
received	billions	of	dollars	of	aid	from	developed	countries,	usually	under	the	form	of	bilateral	
aid,	with	a	“government	to	government”	transfer	(Peron,	2001).	The	bilateral	form	of	the	
development	aid	discussed	in	this	paper	has	decreased	the	ability	of	the	international	
community	to	have	a	direct	control	over	the	use	of	this	aid	(Steinwand,	2015),	and	as	a	result,	
in	some	cases,	this	development	aid	has	led	to	high	levels	of	corruption	as	well	as	political	
instability.	Whilst	foreign	aid	has	been	created	to	ensure	positive	and	development	purposes,	it	
has	often	been	used	for	personal,	destructive	or/and	genocidal	ends	by	African	leaders	(Peron,	
2001).	The	foreign	aid	debate	between	scholars	have	divided	the	scholars	into	two	main	
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groups.	First	those	who	argue	that	that	foreign	aid	and	the	quality	of	governance	are	positively	
related,	and	so,	positively	impacts	the	political	stability	of	the	recipient	country	(Manning	&	
Malbrough,	2014;	Yontcheva	&	Masud,	2005).	On	the	opposite,	scholar	of	the	second	group	
argue	that	foreign	aid	has	done	more	harm	than	good	and	has	weakened	institutions,	affected	
the	quality	of	governance	of	the	recipient	country,	and	this	weak	governance	has	led	to	political	
instability	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	2004	;	Svensson,	2000).	These	scholars	argue	that	foreign	aid,	
when	directly	given	to	governments,	has	increased	the	level	of	corruption	within	the	
institutions	and	the	government,	and	avoided	an	effective	development	of	African	countries,	
what	led	to	the	discontent	of	the	population	and	as	a	result,	ethnic	and	political	tensions	
(Svensson,	2000;	Moyo,	2009).	
	
Table	1.		Foreign	Aid	and	Political	Stability	
Recipient	country	 Amount	of	
foreign	aid*	
Expected	
political	
stability	
Evidence	
of	
political	
stability	
Colonial	
heritage	
Level	of	
corruption		
Rwanda	 High	 Unstable	 Unstable	 Strong	 Low	
Democratic	
Republic	of	Congo	
High	 Unstable	 Unstable	 Strong	 High	
Botswana	 Low	 Stable	 Stable	 Weak	 Low	
Gabon	 Low	 Stable	 Unstable	 Strong	 High	
*The	amount	of	development	aid	received	by	the	countries	are	divided	into	two	groups:	“High”	for	an	average	
amount	of	aid	superior	to	1000	million	dollars	a	year,	and	“Low”	for	an	average	amount	of	aid	inferior	to	1000	
million	dollars	for	the	2010-2016	period.		
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								In	this	paper,	I	tested	the	second	theory,	according	to	which	foreign	aid	is	related	to	
political	instability	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	2004	;	Svensson,	2000;	Moyo,	2009).	As	illustrated	in	
Table	1	above,	I	chose	two	countries	that	have	received	an	important	amount	of	development	
aid	within	the	past	decades,	and	two	others	representing	countries	that	received	an	amount	of	
development	aid	lower	than	the	African	average	(OECD	report,	2016).	As	we	can	see	in	Table	1,	
the	findings	show	that	the	theory	is	supported	in	three	of	the	four	cases	studied	here.	Thus,	by	
discussing	the	amount	of	development	aid	received	by	each	country,	as	well	as	the	quality	of	
governance,	and	its	relationship	to	the	political	instability	of	the	recipient	country,	we	can	see	
that	in	most	cases,	a	high	amount	of	aid	is	related	to	bad	governance	and	political	instability.		
In	the	first	country	discussed,	we	can	see	that	Rwanda,	one	of	the	biggest	African	recipient	
country	in	term	of	development	aid	(OECD	report,	2016),	is	characterized	by	a	high	level	of	
poverty	with	two	third	of	its	population	living	in	extreme	poverty,	as	well	as	a	low	level	in	the	
respect	of	political	and	civil	liberties	(Caplan,	2007).	Whilst	Rwanda	has	avoided	any	violent	
internal	civil	conflicts	since	the	1990’s,	it	is	still	carrying	the	weights	of	the	millions	of	dead	
Rwandese	dead	during	the	civil	war	and	genocide	in	the	early	1990’s.	The	Democratic	Republic	
of	Congo,	one	of	the	bigger	African	recipient	country	in	development	aid	since	its	creation	in	
1969,	also	supports	the	theory.	With	a	perpetual	political	instability	that	continues	today,	a	high	
level	of	corruption	among	its	government	(Kandolo,	2015),	and	a	high	level	of	poverty	among	
its	population,	the	RDC	Is	amongst	the	poorer	and	most	corrupted	country	in	Africa	and	in	the	
world.		
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								The	third	country	discussed	in	this	paper,	Botswana,	chosen	for	the	low	amount	of	
development	aid	that	it	has	received,	also	supports	the	theory.	A	high	level	of	transparency	
among	it	government,	a	higher	level	of	civil	and	political	liberties	compared	to	the	African	
average,	and	a	quick	economic	growth	have	led	Botswana	to	a	relative	political	stability	since	its	
independence	in	1966.	Botswana	illustrates	the	difference	between	African	countries	that	have	
received	a	lot	of	development	aid,	and	those	who	have	received	less	aid,	and	how	this	lower	
amount	of	development	aid	is	related	to	a	better	political	stability.		
	
								The	last	country	discussed	in	this	paper,	Gabon	is	the	only	country	that	does	not	support	
the	theory	according	to	which	countries	who	receive	more	development	aid	will	be	more	
politically	unstable.	Indeed,	Gabon	being	amongst	the	African	countries	that	have	received	the	
lowest	amount	of	development	aid	within	the	past	decades,	was	expected	to	be	characterized	
by	a	good	quality	of	governance	as	well	as	politically	stable.	If	Gabon	hasn’t	been	as	unstable	as	
Rwanda	or	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	by	avoiding	a	civil	war	or	genocide,	the	country	is	
characterized	by	a	high	level	of	corruption	among	its	government,	a	lack	of	freedom	of	press,	
freedom	of	expression,	as	well	as	an	absence	of	respect	for	civil	and	political	rights.	This	bad	
quality	of	governance	has	led	Gabon	to	an	overall	political	instability	with	various	social	protest,	
violent	confrontation	between	the	population	and	governmental	authorities	as	well	as	coup	
d’état	(World	Bank	Report,	2018).	Whilst	Gabon	hasn’t	been	as	unstable	as	Rwanda	and	the	
RDV	it	does	not	support	the	theory.		
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								Even	though	three	out	of	four	the	cases	support	the	hypothesis,	this	paper	can	be	flawed	
by	several	factors.	First,	I	tried	to	choose	four	countries	that	became	independent	
approximately	at	the	time,	avoiding	violent	conflicts	with	the	former	European	colonizer,	
however	it	was	impossible	to	find	four	African	countries	with	the	exact	same	historical	and	
political	background.	Moreover,	my	original	plan	was	to	choose	countries	that	had	been	
colonized	by	the	same	European	powers	(two	French	colonies:	one	receiving	a	lot	of	aid,	the	
other	receiving	an	amount	of	aid	lower	than	the	African	average,	and	two	British	colonies	based	
on	the	same	principle)	in	order	for	the	results	to	not	be	biased	by	the	colonial	background	of	
the	country.	However,	the	difference	in	the	amount	of	aid	wasn’t	consequent	enough	to	
compare	the	direct	impact	of	the	aid	on	the	quality	of	governance	and	political	stability	
between	the	two	groups	of	countries.			
	
								Since	it’s	been	discussed	in	this	paper	that	political	stability	doesn’t	necessarily	mean	a	
high	level	of	democracy,	it	would	be	interesting	for	future	research	to	focus	on	the	same	
countries	and	study	the	relationship	between	the	amount	of	development	aid	received	by	
these	four	countries	and	the	level	of	democratization	each	country	has	experienced	since	its	
independence.	Whilst	this	paper	presents	some	anomalies	and	doesn’t	fully	support	the	tested	
theory,	it’s	a	good	contribution	to	the	existing	literature	on	the	effectiveness	of	foreign	aid	in	
Africa	
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